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I. INTRODUCTION 
The exploding market for books of all kinds in the form of digital files (“e-
books”), which can be read on mobile devices and personal computers, has 
attracted aggressive competition between the two leading online e-book retail-
ers, Amazon, Inc. (“Amazon”) and Apple Inc. (“Apple”).1 While both Amazon 
and Apple have been accused by critics of engaging in anticompetitive practic-
es with regard to e-book sales,2 the U.S. Department of Justice has focused on 
Apple. In 2012, federal prosecutors brought an antitrust suit against Apple and 
five of the nation’s largest book publishers—HarperCollins Publishers LLC 
(“HarperCollins”), Hachette Book Group, Inc. and Hachette Digital 
(“Hachette”); Holtzbrinck Publishers, LLC d/b/a Macmillan (“Macmillan”); 
Penguin Group (USA), Inc. (“Penguin”); and Simon & Schuster, Inc. and 
(“Simon & Schuster”) (collectively, the “Publisher Defendants”)3—for collud-
ing in violation of the Sherman Act to raise the retail prices of e-books.4 Each 
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 1 Complaint at 2–3, United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(No. 12 CV 2826) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 2 Charles E. Schumer, Memo to DOJ: Drop the Apple E-Books Suit, WALL ST. J., July 
17, 2012, at A15. 
 3 See Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. Random House, Inc. is the other one of the six 
largest publishing companies, but was not named as a defendant in either the Justice De-
partment’s case or the parallel class action suit. See id. (United States Justice Department’s 
case); see also In re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., 859 F. Supp. 2d 671, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(parallel class-action lawsuit). 
 4 Complaint, supra note 1, at 7, 31–32. 
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of the Publisher Defendants has settled, leaving Apple the sole defendant in a 
case that was tried in the Southern District of New York in June of 2013.5 That 
trial resulted in a finding that Apple did conspire with the Publisher Defend-
ants to raise the price of e-books, and an order of injunctive relief was granted 
against Apple.6 The Justice Department’s decision to prosecute Apple and the 
Publisher Defendants has been strongly criticized by Apple, as well as 
booksellers, authors, lawmakers and policy groups on the grounds that the e-
book-selling leader, Amazon, is the real anti-competitive culprit.7 Apple and 
the publishers argued that their actions had supplied consumers with alterna-
tive purchase options and had protected consumers from Amazon’s “monopo-
listic grip” over the publishing industry,8 evidenced by the company’s 90% 
market share of e-book sales.9 
This Note examines the history of the Sherman Act and explains why that 
history led to the DOJ’s litigation against Apple, but not against Amazon. Ad-
ditionally, this Note proposes policy changes for antitrust prosecutions in mar-
kets that may have been tainted by a monopoly or market failure, prior to the 
anticompetitive practices being prosecuted. Part II discusses the history of 
Sherman Act jurisprudence. Part III lays out the recent trend toward a strict 
economic basis for antitrust enforcement and the implications of that trend. 
Part IV discusses the case by the Justice Department against Apple and Ap-
ple’s defense at trial. Part V examines the arguments made by the critics of the 
Apple case. Finally, Part VI recommends policy changes to address the conflict 
between the prosecution of Apple and the failure to prosecute Amazon. 
                                                 
 5 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Thirty-three 
states and the District of Columbia also joined the Justice Department as plaintiffs in the 
suit. Id. 
 6 Id. at 709. 
 7 Andrew Tangel, Apple Denies Conspiracy on E-book Prices; Antitrust Trial Opens 
with U.S. Attorneys Saying Firm’s Scheme Cost Readers Millions, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 2013, 
at B2; Salman Rushdie, Status, TWITTER (Mar. 9, 2012, 2:13 PM), 
http://commcns.org/1iSrVy0 (“Seems that the US Justice Dept wants to destroy the world of 
books.”); Schumer, supra note 2, at A15 (“If [the DOJ pursues the case,] “consumers will be 
forced to accept whatever prices Amazon sets.”); Nicole Ciandella, Justice Department 
Should Drop Apple Lawsuit, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1qJjZ3i (“[The publishers’ collective decision to contract with Apple] 
appears to have been a normal response to Amazon’s deep discounts of e-books below phys-
ical book prices. D[O]J’s solution is presumably to stop free enterprise, and allow Amazon 
to dominate e-books?”); see also Laura Hazard Owen, E-Book Smackdown: Who Should 
Control Pricing—Publishers or Amazon?, PAID CONTENT (Mar. 10, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1kzkCsp. 
 8 Aaron Smith, Apple: We Didn’t Stifle E-Book Rivals, CNNMoney (Apr. 13, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1e8GAB6. 
 9 Michael Hiltzik, Government’s E-Book Case Helps Amazon Build Toward a Monopo-
ly, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2012), http://commcns.org/1p1cqRM. 
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It is important to clarify the controversial aspects of this case and to identify 
their nexus with economic and legal principles. It is well accepted that Sher-
man Act antitrust cases depend upon showing that the defendant’s activities 
have frustrated the basic goals of competition10 and have, therefore, harmed the 
competitive process. 11 Both Amazon and Apple claimed that their practices 
benefited competition.12 Amazon argued that it benefited competition by 
providing e-books at affordable prices.13 Apple asserted that its activities pro-
vided additional choices to e-book buyers which benefited consumers, given 
Amazon’s prior domination of the e-book market. 
At first glance, a major weakness for Apple’s policy argument—that its ac-
tions were justified by Amazon’s pre-existing monopoly—seems to be that 
Amazon, rather than using its market power to charge higher-than-fair prices 
for e-books, was charging a predatorily low price of $9.99 per book for best-
sellers, taking a loss of several dollars on each book sold.14 In fact, according to 
the Justice Department’s complaint, the low prices that Amazon charged for 
bestsellers was the very motivation the publishers had for colluding with Ap-
ple.15 Amazon’s supporters claimed that no harm was done by Amazon’s mar-
ket dominance, because its low prices were a benefit to consumers.16 The dis-
trict court judge appears to have agreed with this view, referring to the Ama-
zon-dominated market prior to Apple’s entrance as reflecting a state of “retail 
price competition.”17 An additional charge against Amazon is that its pre-2010 
loss-leader pricing strategy resembles predatory pricing, an illegal tool of mo-
nopoly maintenance through exclusion.18 
                                                 
 10 See Concord v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 1–22 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[A] practice is 
‘anticompetitive’ only if it harms the competitive process . . . . It harms that process when it 
obstructs the achievement of competition’s basic goals-lower prices, better products, and 
more efficient production methods.”). 
 11 Gregory J. Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters 28 (U.S. 
Justice Dep’t, Working Paper, Mar. 1, 2013), available at http://commcns.org/1ibECka. 
 12 Phillip Elmer-DeWitt, The Apple E-Book Anti-Trust Case: The Closing Arguments, 
FORTUNE (June 21, 2013), http://commcns.org/1fO8tPR. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Letter from Mark Cooper, Dir. of Research, Consumer Fed’n of Am., to Senator Herb 
Kohl, Chairman, Senate Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, & Consumer Rights 
(Apr. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Letter from Mark Cooper to Senator Herb Kohl], available at 
http://commcns.org/1ghFrny. 
 17 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 18 K. Craig Wildfang, Predatory Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Do Re-
cent Cases Illuminate the Boundaries?, 31 J. CORP. L. 323, 327 (2005). Monopolists use 
predatory prices, that is, prices set below cost, to exclude would-be competitors from enter-
ing the market, when they have a reasonable expectation that they can raise the price at a 
later time above those that would be offered under a true competitive market, in order to 
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Meanwhile, in the case of Apple the harms of their business activities were 
easy for the Justice Department to recognize and define in court. The result of 
Apple’s “agency pricing” deal with the Publisher Defendants was immediately 
felt by retail e-book customers as a hike in the prices of bestselling e-book ti-
tles. It is important to keep in mind that an increase in prices to consumers is 
not, in theory, the primary harm that modern antitrust law seeks to address.19 
As is discussed below, according to prominent voices of the influential “Law 
and Economics” school of legal thought,20 decreased output—not impact on 
consumer prices—should be the justification for all government prosecution of 
antitrust.21 At trial, Apple did not present evidence showing that its actions did 
not decrease output in strict economic terms, but instead asserted that its pres-
ence in the e-book marketplace created “healthy competition.”22 Thus, Apple 
sought to prevail by the application of reasonable justification for its actions in 
the context of the marketplace and to prove that its deals with the Publisher 
Defendants had a pro-competitive impact on the market for e-books.23 
One possible explanation for the DOJ’s decision to charge Apple with anti-
                                                                                                                 
recoup their losses and receive additional profits. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Pred-
atory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 
697, 703 (1975). 
 19 Werden, supra note 11, at 1, 39. 
 20 “Law and Economics” is the legal discipline which advocates that “allocative effi-
ciency” and “social wealth” should be the primary metrics for judging the costs and benefits 
of legal rules. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 436 (4th ed. 2009). The “Law and Economics” 
discipline was founded by University of Chicago Law School Professor Aaron Director in 
the 1950s. See Ronald Coase, Law and Economics at Chicago, 36 J.L. & ECON. 239, 243–44 
(1993). The “Law and Economics” discipline came to early prominence with publications 
by Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald Coase, The Problem of 
Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 44 (1960). Coase, in particular, is well known for his im-
portant, although long-delayed, impact on American broadcast regulations, having made 
economic arguments for the allocation of radio spectrum by auction in 1959—a practice 
adopted by the Federal Communications Commission in 1994. Thomas W. Hazlett et al., 
Radio Spectrum and the Disruptive Clarity of Ronald Coase, 54 J.L. & ECON. 125, 127 (dis-
cussing Ronald Coase’s influence on the FCC). Additionally, the “Law and Economics” 
discipline is associated with the Chicago school of economics, a school of economic thought 
that grew around several noted economists including Milton Friedman and Frederich Von 
Hyak at the University of Chicago after WWII. See Robert Van Horn, Chicago’s Shifting 
Attitudes Toward Concentrations of Business Power, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1527, 1527 n.1 
(2011). 
 21 RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 34 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW]; see also Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. 
L. REV. 363, 365 (1965) (asserting that interpreters of antitrust law should preserve competi-
tion, because “competition provides society with the maximum output that can be achieved 
at any given time with the resources at its command”). 
 22 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 707–08 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 23 Id. 
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trust violations and not Amazon is the difference in treatment of single-party 
behavior from multi-party behavior under antitrust law. The case law that has 
developed in the one-hundred-year history of the Sherman Act, and especially 
in the last four decades, reserves harsh, per se liability for cases of collabora-
tive price fixing by market competitors such as Apple and the Publisher De-
fendants.24 This harsh treatment of horizontal price fixing contrasts with the 
heavier burden to be met when prosecuting individual companies that pursue 
and maintain market power on their own, as Amazon is widely accused of do-
ing.25 At trial, Apple faced the overriding presumption that its specific actions 
fell under an established per se category of antitrust, precluding consideration 
of its fostering-competition argument.26 Apple failed in its defense against the 
government’s per se case, and Apple’s arguments to justify its actions in light 
of Amazon’s prior market dominance did not persuade the court.27 
The Justice Department’s decision to pursue an antitrust case against Apple 
has been controversial.28 The Justice Department’s case against Apple has re-
ceived heavy criticism from industry groups like the Authors Guild, which 
proclaimed that “our government may be on the verge of killing real competi-
tion in order to save the appearance of competition.”29 New York Senator 
Charles Schumer urged the Justice Department to drop the suit, and even ac-
cused it of threatening to “wipe out the publishing industry as we know it.”30 
Meanwhile, United States v. Apple has been described by a legal expert as, “as 
mainstream an antitrust case as you could possibly imagine.”31 The rest of this 
Note is intended to explain the difference between such opposing views and to 
propose bridging this gap with additional steps in the process of preparing cas-
es that would ensure that antitrust is being pursued in the best interest of the 
                                                 
 24 See Cont’l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50–51 (1977); Werden, supra 
note 11, at 19, 42–44. 
 25 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 37–38 (discussing Standard Oil Company 
of New Jersey v. United States, 211 U.S. 1 (1911), where the Court distinguished between 
anticompetitive behavior by means of “fusion”—also known as merger-to-monopoly—and 
contracts in restraint of trade). 
 26 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 27 Id. at 706–09. 
 28 Christopher Matthews, Should Justice Drop the Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, TIME.COM 
(July 23, 2012), http://commcns.org/NkXHoK. For example, when the Final Judgment for 
the Settling Defendants was opened to public comment, the government received comments 
that “were both voluminous and overwhelmingly negative,” with more than 90% of the 
commenters opposing the Final Judgment. See United States v. Apple Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 
623, 629, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 29 Letter from Scott Turow, President, Authors Guild, to Members (Mar. 9, 2012) [here-
inafter Letter from Scott Turow to Members], available at http://commcns.org/1qk1d2d. 
 30 Schumer, supra note 2, at A15. 
 31 Should Justice Drop the Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, supra note 28. 
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public. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SHERMAN ACT BY THE 
COURTS 
To understand the possible legal implications of the anticompetitive practic-
es of Apple and Amazon and the policies of antitrust prosecutors regarding 
prosecution, it is helpful to examine the relevant concepts in the Sherman Act 
and how they came about. Antitrust law began in America with the passage of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, which makes illegal “every contract . . . or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”32 Section 2 prohibits monopo-
lies or attempts and conspiracies to monopolize.33 The law of antitrust was sub-
sequently expanded by Congress with the Clayton Act of 1914,34 the Robin-
son–Patman Act of 1936,35 and the Tunney Act of 1974.36 Among other things, 
the Clayton Act supplemented the Sherman Act’s general ban on anticompeti-
tive cartels and monopolies with bans on specific activities deemed harmful to 
competition.37 Further, the Clayton Act added regulations as to the merger and 
acquisition processes. 38 The Tunney Act required judicial review and an oppor-
tunity for public comment on settlements between the Justice Department and 
civil antitrust defendants.39 This section will only discuss the Sherman Act’s 
original two provisions, because they are the bases for the Justice Depart-
ment’s case against Apple and the Publisher Defendants—raising § 1 is-
sues40—and the allegations against Amazon of monopoly—raising § 2 issues.41 
Importantly, the standards by which the company’s actions are to be judged 
and, especially, what differentiates them, are not actually in the text of the 
Sherman Act.42 Therefore, it is important to begin—before moving on to the 
particular standards that courts use—with an explanation for why the Sherman 
                                                 
 32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 33 Id. § 2. 
 34 See Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914). 
 35 See Robinson–Patman Antidiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 
(1936). 
 36 See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974). 
 37 15 U.S.C. §§ 13–14. Section 13 bans certain forms of price discrimination. Id. § 13. 
Section 14 bans agreements to not use the goods of a competitor. Id. § 14. 
 38 Id. § 18. 
 39 Id. § 16(b)–(h). 
 40 Complaint, supra note 1, at 1. 
 41 Apple: We Didn’t Stifle E-book Rivals, supra note 8; see 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 42 George E. Garvey, The Sherman Act and the Vicious Will: Developing Standards for 
Criminal Intent in Sherman Act Prosecutions, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 389, 390, 417 (1979). 
The Sherman Act’s legislative history demonstrates that the Sherman Act “was deliberately 
intended to be indefinite with specificity to be provided by the judiciary.” Id. at 417. 
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Act’s standards are overwhelmingly the product of judicial interpretation and 
not statutory text. 
The critical role of jurisprudence in clarifying the boundaries of the Sher-
man Act was necessitated by the Act’s vague text as well as its ambiguous leg-
islative history.43 When it was passed by Congress in 1890, there was little 
agreement about exactly what the two provisions of the Sherman Act would do 
or how they would affect anticompetitive activities.44 Some scholars have con-
cluded that the Sherman Act was intended to maximize wealth,45 while others 
conclude that it was focused only on the protection of consumers.46 Further left 
unanswered was whether enforcement actions and courts should seek to ensure 
the provision of lower prices on goods for consumers, even when those lower 
prices are predatory.47  It is clear is that the framers of the Sherman Act were 
motivated by the public outcry against the “epidemic” problem of the rapid 
combination of firms to form monopolies, also known as the trusts.48 These 
trusts were massively expanding firms, often exploiting newly developed abili-
ties to buy stock in one another, and using their dominating market position to 
either undercut competitors with low prices or gouge consumers with high 
prices.49 It was widely understood that cartelization and monopoly were major 
problems that needed to be addressed, but it was unclear as to how courts and 
prosecutors would go about accomplishing this through the Sherman Act.50 
The text of the Sherman Act addresses two main aspects of anticompetitive 
activity. Section 1 of the Act prohibits the anticompetitive practices that are 
used to build and maintain market power, by proscribing “every contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce.”51 Section 2 prohibits the end result of such practices, the formation 
                                                 
 43 RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC, LAW 
17 (rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA]. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 
7, 7 (1966). 
 46 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws Were Passed to 
Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase Efficiency), 50 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 967 (1999) 
[hereinafter Proving the Obvious]; see also Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers As the Orig-
inal and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 65, 150 (1982) [hereinafter Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Con-
cern of Antitrust]. 
 47 Areeda & Turner, supra note 18, at 706–09 (discussing the administrative difficulty 
in controlling “predatory pricing” practices). 
 48 PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 23. 
 49 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 34. 
 50 PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 17. 
 51 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012); see United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 
(1911); see also Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911). 
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of monopolies, by making illegal, activities that “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize” trade.52 The meaning of these provisions was immediately com-
plicated by several factors. First, the Sherman Act’s statutory prohibitions 
lacked standards that would have allowed judges to form a “coherent, admin-
istrable legal doctrine.”53 Second, the English common law theories on which 
the Act’s language is based did not contain a strong or consistent monopoly 
policy or definition.54 Third, the Act’s sponsors were inconsistent in their 
statements regarding the bill’s purpose beyond the need to protect “fair pric-
es.”55 
With such minimal guidance from the law’s text or legislative history, courts 
were required to enforce the Sherman Act by constructing their own rules ap-
plying reason and economic and civic principles.56 Yet, even after courts began 
to establish the boundaries and standards of the Sherman Act, controversy over 
the proper framework for identifying “restraint of trade” persisted for years.57 
Only in recent decades has a consensus formed that courts are to look not to 
civic or political goals, but solely to economic analysis regarding the “competi-
tive process” as reflected by the overall welfare of society.58 Currently, some 
scholars and practitioners are calling for a return to direct consideration of con-
sumer choice59 and consumer prices60 amidst a majority view that the “competi-
tive process” and total economic efficiency should be the priority, even when 
the result is higher prices or fewer choices for consumers.61 
For a statute that is so reliant on clarification by judge-made rules, the histo-
ry of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act was slow to start. 
                                                 
 52 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 53 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35. 
 54 William L. Letwin, The English Common Law Concerning Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 355, 355–56, 367, 384 (1954). Judge Bork has posited that the framers of the Sherman 
Act referred to the “common law” of antitrust in the bill’s legislative history as a shorthand 
for their favored, often cherry-picked legal opinions while they argued that the principles 
reflected therein were to be codified by the passage of the Act. Legislative Intent and the 
Policy of the Sherman Act, supra note 45, at 36. 
 55 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 34. The Sherman Act passed with a mix 
of legislative intentions: the Act’s authors argued for its passage to ensure economic “liber-
ty” in the form of freedom from market power and to have fair prices for consumers. PERITZ, 
COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 17; see also Garvey, supra note 42, at 
417 (asserting that the Sherman Act’s vagueness was intended by the Act’s drafters). 
 56 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35. 
 57 Garvey, supra note 42, at 417. 
 58 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35. 
 59 Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice: The Practical Reason for 
Both Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 44, 54 (1998). 
 60 Proving the Obvious, supra note 46, at 962. 
 61 Werden, supra note 11, at 2 (“In the 1911 Standard Oil decision, the Supreme Court 
first considered in depth the meaning of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”). 
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For the first two decades after the original passage of the 1890 Act, even the 
justifiable outer limits of antitrust enforcement by government prosecutors was 
left largely unresolved.62 The first major decision by the Supreme Court that 
attempted to define the breadth of the Sherman Act was Standard Oil v. United 
States, in 1911.63 In Standard Oil, the Court created a “rule of reason” to limit 
the prosecution of “contracts in restraint of trade.”64 The Standard Oil Court 
clarified that the language of the statute was not to be interpreted as a literal 
prohibition against any contract which in any way restrains the trade of any 
person (this would of course include practically all contracts).65 The Court ex-
plained that the Act would prohibit only those contracts that unduly restrained 
trade.66 
Under the Standard Oil ruling, courts were instructed in cases of the fusion 
of competing firms, “to leave it to be determined by the light of reason, guided 
by the principles of law and the duty to apply and enforce the public policy 
embodied in the statute, in every given case whether any particular act or con-
tract was within the contemplation of the statute.”67 Justice Holmes clarified 
the rule several years later, stating that “only such contracts and combinations 
are within the act as, by reason of intent or the inherent nature of the contem-
plated acts, prejudice the public interests by unduly restricting competition or 
unduly obstructing the course of trade.”68 This standard puts general public 
welfare at the center of analysis, taking a broad view of an activity’s impact on 
the market as a whole, and ignores the fortunes of individual market partici-
pants. 
While the Standard Oil opinion and its early progeny69 are frequently criti-
cized as lacking specific guidance for courts or business people to follow with 
any consistency,70 modern courts have come to apply a more clearly articulated 
burden-shifting version of the rule of reason as the default standard by which a 
plaintiff’s proof is measured in Sherman Act cases where a per se rule does not 
apply.71 Under “rule of reason” analysis, a plaintiff has an initial burden of 
proving that the defendant engaged in a restraint that threatens the competitive 
                                                 
 62 Werden, supra note 11, at 36; POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 34. 
 63 See generally Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
 64 Id. at 66. 
 65 Id. at 60. 
 66 Id. at 61. 
 67 Id. at 64. 
 68 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376 (1913). 
 69 See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918). 
 70 Andrew Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule 
of Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 733 (2012). 
 71 Id.; Werden, supra note 11, at 43. 
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process.72 If the plaintiff’s initial burden is met, the defendant must show that a 
legitimate objective is served by the defendant’s activities which restrained 
trade.73 Finally, the plaintiff may rebut the defendant’s justification by showing 
that either the defendant’s objective can be achieved by a substantially less 
restrictive alternative or that the challenged behavior is not reasonably neces-
sary to achieve the legitimate objectives claimed by the defendant.74 If applied, 
the rule’s openness to hearing out the defendant’s reasons for engaging in its 
activity might have offered Apple a pathway to a successful defense.75 
At trial, Apple sought to benefit from the rule’s openness by claiming that 
its purpose in dealing with the Publisher Defendants was legitimate and that 
their activities with the publishers had pro-competitive effects.76 Judge Denise 
Cote believed that a rule of reason analysis was inapplicable, because of the 
particular nature of Apple and the Publisher Defendants’ alleged antitrust ac-
tivities.77 Therefore, Apple faced the harsher per se rule against horizontal price 
fixing.78 
Much of the jurisprudence in the intervening years since the Standard Oil 
case centers on the recognition that certain practices are too clearly anticom-
petitive to require the detailed analysis of the “rule of reason” and are, there-
fore, illegal per se under the Sherman Act.79 The first of the per se rules, which 
identified practices that almost always result in a restraint of trade, had been 
issued by the time of the Standard Oil ruling.80 In 1897, in the Trans-Missouri 
                                                 
 72 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see P. 
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507 (3d ed. 2010) [hereinafter AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW]; see 
also Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule 
of reason analysis, under which antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular con-
tract or combination is in fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found un-
lawful.”). 
 73 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502; see also Law v. Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Under a rule of reason analysis, an 
agreement to restrain trade may still survive scrutiny under section 1 if the procompetitive 
benefits of the restraint justify the anticompetitive effects.”). 
 74 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502; see White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Race Tires Am., Inc. v. 
Hoosier Racing Tire Corp, 614 F.3d 57, 74–75 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The plaintiff then must 
demonstrate that the restraint itself is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objec-
tive.”). 
 75 AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502; The Apple E-Book Anti-Trust Case: 
The Closing Arguments, supra note 12. 
 76 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 77 Id. at 691, 694. Judge Cote noted, however, that should the rule of reason have ap-
plied, then Apple would still have violated the Sherman Act, because Apple failed to show 
pro-competitive effects from its agreements with the Publisher Defendants. Id. at 694. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Gavil, supra note 70, at 736 n.19. 
 80 United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
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Freight Association case, the Supreme Court ruled that collusive pricing is 
always inefficient and should be forbidden without regard for “what the intent 
was on the part of those who signed it.”81 The list of per se antitrust activities 
grew over the next several decades to include market divisions and group boy-
cotts, which, along with collusive pricing, are all multi-party activities.82 Addi-
tionally, a list of licensing practices by copyright holders was described by the 
Justice Department as “The Nine No-Nos.”83 
A major distinction has developed between practices which involve “verti-
cal” combinations as well as vertical restraints such as those between produc-
ers and distributors of a product, which are seen as less harmful to competition, 
and “horizontal” mergers and deals between competitors, which receive the 
highest scrutiny, and are subject to the most durable of the per se rules.84 Of 
most import to the case against Apple is the position courts have taken that the 
making of horizontal deals to fix prices—for example, “cartelization”—is 
“manifestly anticompetitive”85 and lacks “any redeeming virtue.”86 These char-
                                                 
 81 Id. at 342. 
 82 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 259–60 (1963). 
 83 Makan Delrahim, Maintaining Flexibility in Antitrust Analysis: Meeting the Chal-
lenge of Innovation in the Media and Entertainment Industries, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 343, 
344 n.2 (2005). 
 84 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (“[The Sherman 
Act contains a] basic distinction between concerted and independent action.”); Thomas 
Leary, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Conference Board 2004 Antitrust Con-
ference: Structured Outline for the Analysis of Horizontal Agreements 1 (Mar. 3–4, 2004), 
available at http://commcns.org/1cEXOYp; see also Werden, supra note 11, at 41. 
 85 Cont’l T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977). 
 86 Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289 
(1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 365 
(“Price-fixing is antisocial precisely because it lessens the total output of society. When 
competitors agree on higher prices and put them into effect, they necessarily restrict output 
and so reduce total wealth.”). Robert Bork was talking about physical commodities that 
always incur a substantial marginal cost to produce one more widget, but it is uncertain how 
his analysis applies to e-books when the marginal cost of another copy of a bestseller is 
negligible for the publisher. Seth Godin, How Much Should an eBook Cost?, DOMINO PRO-
JECT (Dec. 20, 2011), http://commcns.org/1h29gKD. But will a price-fixing agreement 
among competitors in digital media ever result in no societal decrease in total output? As-
suming that at a higher price, fewer books would likely be sold, the answer depends on 
whether that reduction in dissemination of the digital media represents a real reduction in 
societal output. It its briefs in the Apple case, the Justice Department has relied more on the 
simple effect of higher prices for consumers as evidence of an antitrust harm. Complaint, 
supra note 1, at 5 (alleging that “Defendants’ ongoing conspiracy and agreement have 
caused e-book consumers to pay tens of millions of dollars more for e-books than they oth-
erwise would have paid”). Yet, a reduced volume in e-book sales as compared to a hypo-
thetical scenario should be the legitimate measure of societal loss under the Borkean model. 
As long as the expected result of higher prices on a digital commodity is fewer copies sold, 
it seems unlikely that price-fixing agreements for digital commodities should be any differ-
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acterizations also differentiate the conduct by both Apple and Amazon. While 
Apple was liable for participating in a horizontal price-fixing scheme, Amazon 
was criticized for using its vertical integration as a publisher, retailer, and e-
reader seller to disrupt traditional publishers and devalue their products.87 
While the case law has differentiated between certain multi-party and single-
party anticompetitive behaviors, there are arguments to be made for applying 
similar treatment to single and multiple-party offenders overall. Judge Richard 
Posner, a proponent of the “Law and Economics” discipline, has written that 
“[a]n intelligent antitrust policy cannot stop with collusive pricing among in-
dependent firms and ignore monopoly pricing by a single firm.”88 He calls for 
similar treatment of multi-party and single-party price fixing, or else compet-
ing firms would be given “an incentive to merge into a single firm in order to 
be able to practice monopoly pricing without inviting punishment.”89 A major 
contrast between the activities of Apple and the activities of Amazon is that 
Amazon did not enter into agreements with any external entity to conduct its 
offending business practices. But if, as Judge Posner says, a single company 
which fixes prices is equally guilty of anticompetitive behavior as a group of 
companies who work together to fix prices,90 then the legal boundary between 
Apple’s price-setting collusion and the “anti-competitive” prices used by Ama-
zon for e-books becomes blurred. 
Unlike “anti-competitive” pricing, the price-fixing conspiracies typically re-
quire multiple parties and, therefore, generate more evidence of meetings and 
other conspiratorial conduct.91 In United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., the 
Supreme Court narrowed the requirements for proving that activities had pro-
duced negative outcomes, in cases dealing with per se Sherman Act viola-
tions.92 In Socony-Vacuum—also known as Madison Oil—the Court produced 
the “definitive” statement of the rule against price fixing,93 but this time the 
                                                                                                                 
ent from those for physical commodities. 
 87 Amy Martinez, Amazon.com Trying to Wring Deep Discounts from Publishers, SE-
ATTLE TIMES, http://commcns.org/1e8GTf1 (last updated Apr. 2, 2012, 11:13 AM). 
 88 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 37. 
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. (“An intelligent antitrust policy cannot stop with collusive pricing among inde-
pendent firms and ignore monopoly pricing by a single firm.”). 
 91 Id. at 66. Posner notes that “launching a cartel may require elaborative negotiations 
among the parties, which must be carried on in a clandestine manner to avoid immediate 
detection by the antitrust enforcers” and that the “likelihood of detection” rises with the 
number of parties. Id. 
 92 See generally United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
 93 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 36–37. “Madison Oil” comes from the 
name of the city where the trial was held: Madison, Wisconsin. Id. at 37 n.10. In the Apple 
opinion, Judge Cote relied on Arizona v. Maricopa County to conclude that the prosecution 
had successfully shown that Apple committed a per se violation of the Sherman Act. United 
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Court left out any requirement for a potential impact on prices.94 The Socony-
Vacuum Court held that any attempt at per se anticompetitive behavior, such as 
a meeting or a contract for price fixing, even with little likelihood of success, 
could be illegal.95 
The government has responded to this shift by employing strategies in price-
fixing cases that had proven successful in prosecuting conspiracies, focusing 
their efforts on proving illicit communications (for example, in-person meet-
ings, email, or telephone conversations).96 The government’s complaint against 
Apple and the Publisher Defendants consisted largely of a narrative of meet-
ings and communications between the Publisher defendants and Apple that 
relies heavily on such details.97 It is plausible that the prosecutors believed that 
Socony-Vacuum relieved them of the need to prove that a conspiracy damaged 
competition overall (which Apple contested) or that there was a potential for 
an increase in prices. 
The Socony-Vacuum decision also foreclosed the possibility that Apple 
could defend itself by arguing that the deals made with the Publisher Defend-
ants were justified by Amazon’s anti-competitive pricing on e-books.98 Accord-
                                                                                                                 
States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The Court, in Maricopa 
County, noted that under “the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with 
the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity . . . 
is illegal per se. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 347, 351 (1982) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that the “anticompetitive potential inherent in all 
price-fixing agreements justifies their facial invalidation even if procompetitive justifica-
tions are offered”). 
 94 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. 
 95 Id. 
 96 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 37. Note that the DOJ will bring criminal 
charges against actors involved in price-fixing agreements; however, the type of case 
brought depends on the nature of the underlying conduct. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTI-
TRUST DIVISION MANUAL, at III-12 (5th ed. 2012), available at 
http://commcns.org/1ghFyQ5. Under Matsushita v. Zenith, to overcome summary judgment, 
the claimant must present unambiguous evidence that tends to exclude an innocent interpre-
tation. Matsushita Electric Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597–98 (1986) 
(“On remand, the Court of Appeals is free to consider whether there is other evidence that is 
sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired to price 
predatorily for two decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do so. The evi-
dence must ‘ten[d] to exclude the possibility’ that petitioners underpriced respondents to 
compete for business rather than to implement an economically senseless conspiracy.”). 
Antitrust cases involving collusion are particularly difficult under the high evidentiary 
standards. Collusive conduct, without evidence of an agreement, is nearly impossible to 
detect, let alone prove. Lawyers refer to the phenomenon of coordination of pricing “with-
out any overt detectable acts of communication” as “conscious parallelism,” but Posner calls 
it “tacit collusion.” POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 53. 
 97 Complaint, supra note 1, at 13–15. 
 98 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221–22 (“[Congress] has no more allowed genuine or fancied 
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ing to the Socony-Vacuum Court, the Sherman Act generally prohibits collu-
sive activity, regardless of the justification.99 Thus, under Socony-Vacuum, 
price-fixing cases—like the one against Apple—allow little opportunity to jus-
tify such activities on the basis of accusations of pre-existing price fixing by 
other market participants. 
III. THE RISE OF THE “LAW AND ECONOMICS” VIEW OF 
ANTITRUST AND RECENT TRENDS IN ENFORCEMENT 
By the mid-1950s, the basic structure of the “rule of reason” was largely 
agreed upon, while the number of per se rules had begun to grow. Yet, scholars 
and professionals disagreed over the ultimate goals of antitrust law.100 In the 
1950s and 1960s, antitrust law sought generally to protect unrestrained compe-
tition, while accounting for the costs of goods and the viability of small busi-
nesses.101 However, antitrust law did not have coherent goals to justify en-
forcement, which Bork considered irrational.102 However, in 1977, a decisive 
shift occurred when the Supreme Court, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc., overruled the per se rule against non-price vertical restraints.103 The 
last four decades have seen the continued move away from many of the previ-
ously established per se rules and toward a consensus in the courts that en-
forcement of antitrust laws should include an economic analysis as to how an-
titrust activities impact society’s “total welfare” by harming the competitive 
process.104 Support for this trend originated with the “Law and Economics” 
movement in the 1960s, led by the influential advocacy of Robert Bork and 
Richard Posner, among others.105 
                                                                                                                 
competitive abuses as a legal justification for [price-fixing] schemes than it has the good 
intentions of the members of the combination.”). 
 99 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 221–22. 
 100 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 50 
(1978) [hereinafter THE ANTITRUST PARADOX]. 
 101 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 373; see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (describing the “preservation of our democratic political and 
social institutions” as among the purposes of the Sherman Act). 
 102 THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 100, at 50. 
 103 Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977); see also Werden, 
supra note 11, at 20 (noting the Sylvania decision’s importance). 
 104 Gavil, supra note 70, at 734 (noting that, since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has “ 
march[ed] away from per se rules” and has incorporated economic principles into the rule-
of-reason analysis). 
 105 Dylan Matthews, ‘Antitrust Was Defined by Robert Bork. I Cannot Overstate His 
Influence’, WASH. POST (Dec. 20. 2012), http://commcns.org/1bkRbDX; see Roger Parloff, 
The Negotiator No One Doubts That Richard Posner Is a Brilliant Judge and Antitrust The-
oretician. Is That Enough to Bring Microsoft and the Government Together?, CNNMONEY 
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While largely successful in their influence on jurisprudence, “Law and Eco-
nomics” proponents have recognized that their approach differs from the popu-
list impulses with which the American public understood the antitrust laws.106 
It is not surprising then, that Senator Schumer and other proponents of the pub-
lic controversy over the Justice Department’s decision to prosecute Apple 
omitted legal rationales from their criticisms.107 
The heart of the “Law and Economics” approach to antitrust is a consistent 
economic understanding of the harms understood to result from the process of 
forming and maintaining monopoly power.108 When a firm gains monopoly 
power over a market, it is no longer subject to the standard competitive im-
pulse to produce the greatest possible quantity of the product and offer it for 
the lowest possible price.109 Once monopoly power is obtained and competition 
is eliminated entirely or diminished seriously, then producing less of a product 
while raising the price may be a more profitable strategy for the producer.110 A 
producer (or a cartel) that controls the majority of the market share can with-
hold supply from the market to the extent necessary to increase demand, allow-
ing the monopolist to raise prices.111 
Although the monopolist must sell fewer items to achieve the desired higher 
prices, his primary benefit is from the increase in the marginal profit returned 
on the items produced—the source of monopoly profits.112 So as long as com-
petitors control a small fraction of the market, then each competitor’s ability to 
affect prices by reducing supply will be offset by the other competitors’ will-
ingness to increase output.113 Thus, the monopolist profits while prices rise and 
                                                                                                                 
(Jan. 10, 2000), http://commcns.org/1hWrZJv. 
 106 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 35 (“After a century and more of judicial 
enforcement of the antitrust statutes, there is a consensus that guidance must be sought in 
economics” rather than populist notions). Posner describes “populist impulses” as seeking to 
protect consumers from high prices and loss of choices, and to shield small businesses from 
the advantages of larger corporate competitors and the powers of concentrated wealth. Id. at 
34. 
 107 See, e.g., Schumer, supra note 2, at A15; Letter from Scott Turow to Members, supra 
note 29. Some have argued that antitrust enforcement is particularly susceptible to the ef-
fects of public perception. See Larry Smith, Continental Airlines Navigates Public Scrutiny 
over Antitrust Exemption, LEVICK DAILY (Apr. 15, 2009), http://commcns.org/1d4UiH1. 
 108 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 9 (arguing that the monopolist’s 
“‘power over price’”—for example, the ability to use market power to set high prices and 
drive down production—is “the essence of the economic concept of monopoly.”). 
 109 Id. at 10. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 10–11. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 10. Ultimately the high prices for the monopolized item motivate additional 
suppliers to enter the market and compete by offering prices slightly lower than the mo-
nopolist’s price. Id. This leads to the common refrain from proponents of lax antitrust en-
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while consumer choice, total employment, small business growth, and innova-
tion decrease.114 
This is where the so-called “layperson’s” narrative of the danger of anti-
competitive activity often ends.115 Yet, Judge Posner discounts some of the 
popularly feared effects of monopolies, arguing, for example, that the price 
effects of a monopoly on consumers should be ignored as merely transfer 
payments, which were costless to society.116 Furthermore, “Law and Econom-
ics” advocates consider protectionist motivations for antitrust enforcement 
economically unsound.117 Judge Posner believes that the “economic theory of 
monopoly provides the only sound basis for antitrust policy.”118 The “economic 
theory of monopoly”—according to Posner and other “Law and Economics” 
advocates—opposes monopolies as decreasing society’s total wealth and as 
decreasing customer satisfaction.119 Under this view, the true evil of monopoly 
primarily accrues through a “loss in value resulting from the substitution [by 
customers] for the monopolized product” causing a “net loss” to the econo-
my.120 While increased prices to consumers may be the most noticeable and 
politically resonant effect of monopolies, they are seen as less detrimental than 
the cost that monopolies impose on society as a whole.121 In short, increased 
prices reward the monopolist’s reduced production of demanded goods, while 
                                                                                                                 
forcement that “all monopolies are temporary.” But the problem is the damage to public 
welfare that occurs while they exist and the waste caused by single entities or groups seek-
ing to gain monopoly power by inefficient means. Id. at 13–14. 
 114 Id. at 12. 
 115 Id. at 13. 
 116 Id. (“Those higher prices are the focus of the layperson’s concern about monopoly-an 
example of the often sharp divergence between lay economic intuition and economic analy-
sis.”). The monopolist unfairly takes property from the consumer without providing any 
compensating “transfer payments.” Judge Posner advocates ignoring this wealth transfer 
from the consumer to the monopolist when calculating the harm of a monopoly because in 
the scheme of the economy as a whole it sums to zero, albeit recognizing the collateral pos-
sibility of some net loss to society’s total welfare due to indirect effects of monopoly pricing 
as an incentive toward inefficient monopoly-seeking behavior by producers and distributors. 
This is distinct from other effects of monopoly such as inefficiency and decreases in overall 
economic output. See id. For a view opposing the Chicago School’s, see Robert Lande’s 
article, Wealth Transfers As the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust, supra note 46, 
at 76. 
 117 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 364 (“It is the rapid acceleration of the . . . 
‘protectionist’ trends in antitrust that has brought on the present crisis.”). 
 118 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 9. 
 119 See also Robert Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Anti-
trust: Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2349, 2351 n.4 (2013). 
 120 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 13. 
 121 George J. Stigler, Monopoly, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://commcns.org/1fgmmBz 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
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forcing consumers to satisfy their demands at a higher cost by resorting to sub-
stitutes.122 Posner and “Law and Economics” proponents believe that the main 
concern should be preventing inefficiency caused by artificial scarcity.123 
This contention is critical to understanding why the practices of Amazon 
and the prosecution of Apple raise such fundamental concerns in antitrust 
law.124 Under the economic theory of modern antitrust law, the higher prices 
that consumers paid for e-book bestsellers, after Apple entered the market, is 
only relevant as circumstantial evidence that fewer e-books were distributed 
than otherwise would have been.125 If this theory were followed without regard 
to the per se rule against price fixing, then the only economically sound basis 
for prosecuting Apple and the Publisher Defendants would be their collusion’s 
effect of lowering the overall output of e-books.126 
Judge Posner’s view of “efficiency” as the sole legitimate goal of competi-
tion policy has been criticized for inconsistently describing the measure of ef-
ficiency.127 According to “Law and Economics” proponents, the Sherman Act 
should only be enforced on the basis of cognizable harm to competition that 
results in reduced output.128 If this is true, can Apple’s transgressions be justi-
fied under the Sherman Act by the necessities of competing against an existing 
monopoly? The previous section discussed the adoption of per se rules, includ-
ing the rule against horizontal price fixing, which, under the ruling of Socony-
Vacuum, foreclosed any further economic analysis or the “rule of reason.”129 
But in subsequent cases in the 1970s and 1980s, the courts have softened some 
of the per se doctrines to be presumptions which can be rebutted by a showing 
of circumstances that the defendant was not engaging in restraining trade.130 
                                                 
 122 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 12–13. As an example, a monopoly cost 
of a pork chop that is sold at a monopoly price is of little or no concern to Posner but true 
harm of monopolies is the aggregate effect on the economy. This causes consumers to un-
necessarily eat Spam when they really want pork chops and could afford pork chops if they 
were sold at a lower, more competitive market-price. 
 123 POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 2. 
 124 Should Justice Drop the Apple Ebook Lawsuit?, supra note 28. 
 125 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 21, at 12. 
 126 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 365 (“Price-fixing is antisocial precisely 
because it lessens the total output of society. When competitors agree on higher prices and 
put them into effect, they necessarily restrict output and so reduce total wealth.”). 
 127 Rudolph J. Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the 
Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1289 (1984). 
 128 The Crisis in Antitrust, supra note 21, at 365. 
 129 See supra Part II. 
 130 See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
100–01 (1984) (holding that “we have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per 
se rule to this case,” because the NCAA is “an industry in which horizontal restraints on 
competition are essential if the product is to be available at all”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979) (applying the “rule of reason” to analyze the 
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Apple’s best hope at overcoming the government’s case at trial was to show 
evidence that the per se rule against price fixing should not apply, that its deals 
with the Publisher Defendants was necessary for its legitimate business objec-
tives, and that its activities had procompetitive effects.131 Apple was unsuccess-
ful at each of these goals.132 
IV. THE CASE AGAINST APPLE AND THE PUBLISHER 
DEFENDANTS 
Now that the Sherman Act’s history and current jurisprudential standards 
have been discussed, we can address the central purpose of this article, to as-
sess the decision of the Justice Department to prosecute Apple for violating the 
Sherman Act. Apple’s entry into the market for digital books was strikingly 
different from Amazon in approach and market effects.133 However, the tactics 
employed by both companies in the few short years since they began selling e-
books have been unconventional and ruthless.134 With the e-book market, Ap-
ple and Amazon have both been in competition.135 In 2009, Amazon was main-
taining a 90% market share in e-books, selling bestsellers at $9.99 per title.136 
Amazon’s retail price on many bestsellers was several dollars less than the 
wholesale price for which the Publisher Defendants sold the books to Ama-
                                                                                                                 
allegedly anti-competitive activity, because the “blanket license has provided an acceptable 
mechanism for at least a large part of the market”). 
 131 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 691, 694–95, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); 
see AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 72, ¶ 1502. As Professor Areeda explained: 
To avoid dismissal, the plaintiff must allege that competition in a specified market has 
been restrained. To avoid adverse summary judgment it must show that the facts favor 
or at least that there are disputed material facts on that question. If such a restraint is 
shown, the burden passes to the defendant to offer evidence that a legitimate objective 
is served by the alleged behavior. That justification will be lost if the plaintiff shows 
that the objective can be achieved by a substantially less restrictive alternative . . . [For 
a legitimate and necessary objective], the harms and benefits must be compared to 
reach a net judgment whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, reasonable. 
Id. 
 132 Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 691, 694–95, 700. 
 133 Schumer, supra note 2, at A15. 
 134 See Ken Auletta, Publish or Perish: Can the iPad Topple the Kindle, and Save the 
Book Business?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 26, 2010), http://commcns.org/1cL4C14 (“Jobs 
planned to stand on Amazon’s neck and press down hard, with publishers applauding.”); 
Complaint, supra note 1, at 3 (“Apple had long believed it would be able to ‘trounce Ama-
zon by opening up [its] own ebook store.’”); Martinez, supra note 87; Richard Eskow, Pro-
testers Confront Amazon Founder Jeff Bezos, THENATION.COM (May 29, 2012), 
http://commcns.org/1eemOR4. 
 135 Mark Rogowsky, E-Book Case Reminds Apple Its Biggest Enemy Isn’t Samsung or 
Google, FORBES (Aug. 3, 2013), http://commcns.org/PdVE7y. 
 136 Hiltzik, supra note 9. 
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zon.137 The Publisher Defendants feared that Amazon’s $9.99 price, which was 
substantially lower than the price for hardcover versions, would become the 
new standard, thereby driving down prices for hardcovers and for best-selling 
and newly released e-books, in general.138 In early 2010, Apple made an 
agreement with each of the five largest book publishers to sell e-books in Ap-
ple’s online iTunes store under an “agency” pricing model, which allowed the 
publishers to raise the prices at which e-books would be sold and would guar-
antee Apple a 30% margin.139 It is these deals between Apple and the book 
publishers, which are the central activities for which the Justice Department 
prosecuted Apple for violating the Sherman Antitrust Act.140 In assessing the 
case against Apple, this section first looks at the deals and how they came 
about in detail, and then considers the defenses Apple attempted to employ. 
Apple and its original co-defendants, the Publisher Defendants, each entered 
into their agency-pricing deals with clear motivations.141 Apple had an interest 
in becoming a retailer of e-books in order to expand the utility of its digital 
content marketplace, the iTunes store.142 Only two years before, Apple CEO 
Steve Jobs had expressed doubt about the profitability of ebooks, saying, “It 
doesn’t matter how good or bad the product is, the fact is that people don’t 
read anymore.”143 By the time that Apple was planning for the debut of the 
iPad, it was clear that by adding e-books to the media catalogue of iTunes, Ap-
ple would be raising revenue while destroying its rival’s market dominance in 
e-books.144 
Meanwhile, the publishers were interested in the higher price at which Ap-
ple was selling books to consumers.145 However, the Justice Department’s 
complaint characterizes Amazon’s low prices as a beneficial and natural result 
of healthy “price competition.”146 The complaint states that the Publisher De-
fendants intended to end this competition and cause e-book prices to rise above 
the $9.99 that Amazon was offering.147 It is clear from the Publisher Defend-
ants’ statements quoted by the complaint that the publishers were so interested 
in pushing e-book prices up that they were willing to give Apple a 30% com-
                                                 
 137 Complaint, supra note 1, at 9. 
 138 Id. at 10. 
 139 Complaint, supra note 1, at 3. 
 140 Id. at 5. 
 141 Auletta, supra note 134. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 Complaint, supra note 1, at 2. 
 147 Id. at 2–3. 
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mission on each e-book that Apple sold.148 Under the agency pricing model, 
publishers controlled the sale price, and the retailer became the publishers’ 
“agent,” having no power to “alter the retail prices set by the publishers.”149 
Apple’s 30% commission was bigger than the commission Amazon received 
from wholesale pricing, even for those books that were not sold for a loss.150 
Publishers charged Amazon and other wholesale retailers around $13 for a 
bestseller.151 However, the publishers’ share of e-book sales with Apple usually 
resulted in approximately a $9 share.152 Still, publishers believed that the de-
creased revenue was worth it to keep retail prices high for both e-books and 
printed books.153 
Industry analysts list several reasons book publishers desired rising e-book 
prices despite a loss of direct revenue from each e-book sold. Most directly, the 
publishers believed that the price Amazon sought for best-selling titles created 
an incorrect public perception that $9.99 represented a fair price for a best-
selling e-book copy and, by inference, devalued the best-selling print versions 
of books.154 Therefore, the publishers believed that pushing the price of e-books 
upwards would result in increased profits from print books, which was feasible 
in a world without $9.99 e-book bestsellers.155 
The publishers may also have been motivated to collude with Apple so as to 
gain bargaining leverage over Amazon.156 As discussed below, after announc-
ing their deals with Apple, the publishers approached Amazon with a credible 
threat to pull their books from Amazon’s catalog—an offer Amazon could not 
refuse.157 
Traditionally, publishers had sole control of the distribution channel be-
tween authors and consumers.158 Another major motivation to make agency-
pricing deals with Apple was that they were existentially threatened by the 
prospect of Amazon using its domination of e-book sales to sign-up its own 
authors.159 Amazon had already begun to offer authors the opportunity to sell e-
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books directly to Amazon customers in the “Kindle” digital format, circum-
venting the need for publishers.160 Facing the prospect of obsolescence, brought 
on by growing number of self-publishing options, traditional publishers were 
placed in an unfamiliar position of defending their very roles in the industry.161 
Defenders of the role of the publishers claimed that publishers add value 
through their discovery of great books and authors and their editing services, 
neither of which Amazon provides.162 
If Amazon could convince customers that books were worth less than the 
publishers believed, while also expanding the ability of authors to self-publish, 
then the publishers could be squeezed out of the publishing equation.163 The 
publishers feared a literary world where they no longer existed; a world where 
all books were offered directly by the author and were not vetted by “real” edi-
tors.164 Amazon’s e-book discounts posed an existential threat to the publishers, 
and the publishers wanted the practice curtailed. At the same time, Apple was 
preparing to launch the iPad, and Apple intended to sell e-books. The two, Ap-
ple and the publishers, came together to limit the retail-price competition 
amongst e-books.165 However, the government needed to prove exactly how 
Apple and the publishers worked together to set prices or stifle competition.166 
According to the DOJ’s complaint, the “price fixing” agreement started with 
the publishers not long after Amazon had come to dominate the e-book mar-
ket.167 In 2008 and 2009, the CEOs of each of the Publisher Defendants met 
about every three months at restaurants in Manhattan and discussed the in-
creasing market for e-books and Amazon’s role in that market.168 They dis-
cussed what one called the “$9.99 problem” posed by Amazon.169 
At these restaurant meetings, the company executives discussed how “Ama-
zon had been buying many e-books from publishers for about [$13.00] and 
selling them for $9.99, taking a loss on each book in order to gain market share 
and encourage sales of its electronic reading device, the Kindle.”170 According 
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to the prosecution in the Apple case, by the end of 2009, a conspiracy emerged 
between the Publisher Defendants, called joint ventures, which had the purpose 
of stopping retail-price competition and raising e-book prices above $9.99.171 
This strategy, the switch to selling e-books by an “agency model” where retail 
prices would be dictated by the publishers, was considered impossible without 
the participation of publishers representing a major portion of Amazon’s mar-
ket share.172 Also critical was the inclusion of a “most favored nation” clause in 
each of Apple’s contracts with the publishers, guaranteeing Apple the ability to 
match the lowest price of each title offered by any competitor.173 This price 
parity provision imposed severe penalties on any publisher who would choose 
to stay with the old wholesale model, guaranteeing to each of the publishers 
that they would act as a group. 174 
The Publisher Defendants carried out their plan, so as to avoid antitrust lia-
bility. Ken Auletta, a media business writer for the New Yorker, reported some 
of the most important details of the case in an article in spring 2010.175 After 
speaking extensively with the publishers, he observed that “none of the pub-
lishers seemed to think that they could act alone, and if they presented a uni-
fied demand to Amazon they risked being charged with price-fixing and collu-
sion.”176 That report indicates that the publishers approached the plan with req-
uisite caution about the very prosecution that they ultimately faced, and care-
fully chose a method they believed would allow them to address the “$9.99” 
problem without violating the antitrust laws.177 
On January 27, 2010, Apple announced its plan to enter the e-book mar-
ket.178 Prior to that announcement, however, each publisher had contracted with 
Apple.179 Then, bound by the most-favored-nation clause in their contracts with 
Apple, the publishers collectively forced the agency-pricing switch on their e-
book sellers in a matter of weeks and months, beginning with Amazon.180 For-
mer Apple CEO Steve Jobs announced that Apple had made deals with the 
publishers to sell their books in the iTunes store in his speech at the media 
event premiering the iPad on January 27, 2010.181 Jobs, after his presentation, 
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was interviewed by Walt Mossberg at the Wall Street Journal.182 When Moss-
berg asked why consumers would pay Apple $14.99 when they can buy the 
same book from Amazon for $9.99, Jobs responded, “That won’t be the case. 
The price will be the same.”183 Continuing, Jobs said, “Publishers may with-
hold their books from Amazon,” because “[t]hey’re unhappy.”184 
These quotes seemed damning enough to the Justice Department that they 
were laid-out in the complaint against Apple and the publishers, and were pre-
sented throughout the Apple trial.185 What Jobs knew regarding the motivations 
of the publishers and when he knew it were central issues in the prosecution’s 
case.186 If he were still alive at the time, Jobs may have been called to testify in 
the trial.187 Instead, the DOJ quoted Walter Issacson’s biography of Steve Jobs 
and emails he wrote at the time of the e-book deals, which suggest that he 
knew that Apple was providing the publishers with a conduit through which to 
coordinate their desired change in pricing models.188 
It is essential to the prosecution of an antitrust collusion case to prove the 
actual “acts of conspiring” which formed an anti-competitive conspiracy be-
tween the defendants. 189 The deals Apple made with each of the publisher de-
fendants were “vertical” in orientation, that is, between entities placed consec-
utively in the chain of commerce.190 As discussed previously, vertical price 
fixing strategies are not per se illegal under the Sherman Act in the way that 
horizontal schemes are.191 Therefore, to foreclose Apple’s ability to argue to-
ward positive impacts of its deal in a “rule of reason” analysis, it was necessary 
to the Justice Department’s case to show that a “horizontal” agreement was 
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made between market competitors attempting to stifle competition and that 
Apple was a knowing participant in a conspiracy to make such a deal.192 To 
make its case, the Justice Department introduced numerous records of emails 
and calls between the executives of the publishers and Apple, and presented a 
graphical representation of the publishers’ communications with Apple that 
depicted Apple at the hub of the communications, surrounded by the Publisher 
Defendants.193 The government claimed that Apple willingly served as a “criti-
cal conspiracy participant” with the Publisher Defendants.194 Apple hoped to 
show on a factual basis that it did not conspire with the Publishers and did not 
know that they were attempting to raise e-book prices when it made the deals. 
Apple argued that it made the agency pricing deals with each of the publishers, 
and all in close succession, in order to provide “the best possible e-reading ex-
perience for consumers” on its iPad and to announce the arrangements at the 
event introducing the iPad.195 
Even if Apple were to avoid facing a per se Sherman Act case by showing 
that it was not part of the horizontal price fixing conspiracy to which the Pub-
lisher Defendants settled before trial,196 the case could still have been litigated 
successfully by the DOJ on the broader argument that Apple unreasonably re-
strained trade by making deals that raised e-book prices.197 In other words, cas-
es of vertical price-fixing are not considered per se anti-competitive, but must 
be considered under the “rule of reason” analysis discussed in Part II.198 Unlike 
with a per se case, the evidence must address the actual harm that would have 
been caused to competition as a result of Apple’s collusion with each of the 
publishers.199 Most obvious is the harm of the increased prices of e-books to 
consumers under Apple’s agency pricing deals with publishers.200 Apple’s e-
book prices were soon adopted by e-book retailers and within weeks the price 
of e-books, including those sold by Amazon, increased by several dollars.201 
According to one estimate, this price increase cost consumers $200 million in 
2012.202 Although Apple faced a per se case, Apple argued, at trial, that its ac-
tions did not harm the competition. Apple presented a chart that showed while 
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prices for e-books sold by the Publisher Defendants did increase, the overall 
average price of all e-books sold, including by other publishers, actually de-
creased subsequent to Apple’s entry and the switch to agency pricing.203 
From the perspective of consumers, the increased cost of goods available to 
them is the clearest harm of anti-competitive behavior.204 But, as discussed pre-
viously, for advocates of the Chicago School of Law and Economics, increased 
consumer costs are not the correct measure of harm for Sherman Act viola-
tions.205 Judge Richard Posner explains that the layperson’s concern that cus-
tomers of a monopolized good pay a higher price is not the most important 
adverse effect of a monopoly.206 Posner would argue that the loss to consumers 
who paid the higher monopoly price was “a transfer payment and therefore a 
mere bookkeeping entry on the social books.”207  More important, according to 
Posner and other “Law and Economics” advocates, is the economist’s concern 
for a loss of value to the whole economy from the inefficiency caused by con-
sumers’ substitution of inefficient alternatives in place of their preferred, but 
monopolized item.208 According to this view, monopoly’s net costs to society 
are in inefficient substitution, inefficient expense by sellers to gain a monopo-
ly, and inefficient expenses by consumers to avoid paying monopoly prices.209 
These net costs are difficult to calculate. It also makes it essential to consider 
the behavior of consumers within the market.210 Nevertheless, when these net 
costs are found to exist, then there are actionable antitrust violations.211 Judge 
Posner says that the profits from monopoly pricing are often wasted on protect-
ing and concealing the monopoly.212 Therefore, if Apple and the publishers had 
used their increased revenue to build and maintain a dominating market share 
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or to stifle competition, then those expenses are lost to society and, therefore, 
should be counted as the harm of the antitrust violations as well.213 Under this 
approach, Apple and the publishers would not be guilty of antitrust violations 
if the consumers who would have purchased e-books from Apple at the lower 
price of $9.99 were driven by higher prices to fill their demand with a less de-
sirable and, therefore, less-efficient alternative (e.g., older, cheap e-book titles, 
or printed books). 
If antitrust liability should be solely based on the harm from a monopoly to 
society, then one market’s failure could counteract the harmful effects of an-
other market’s failure (e.g. a monopoly), thereby justifying anticompetitive 
behavior.214 One novel theory, known as the intramarket second-best trade-offs 
defense, says just that.215 Under second-best trade-offs, antitrust defendants 
have argued that prosecuting them is not in the public interest, because allow-
ing their collusion and reduced production is the second-best alternative to 
eliminating all market failures, which for one reason or another is not possi-
ble.216 
Apple may argue that Amazon’s dominance and maintenance of that domi-
nance, through offering $9.99 bestsellers, represents a market failure causing 
irreversible harm to society, and that Apple’s collusion was the second-best 
alternative to the government stopping the market failure directly.217 While this 
argument theoretically offers hope to a defendant not facing a per se case, it 
has not succeeded in the courts.218 Judge Posner, while acknowledging that the 
logic of second-best trade-offs follows from some Chicago School theories, 
calls its requirements for voluminous economic proof “unworkable” in a prac-
tical sense.219 Posner declares, “Finally and decisively, antitrust litigation, al-
ready fearfully protracted, costly, and complex, would be completely unwork-
able if a second-best defense were recognized.”220 Chicago School-style eco-
nomic calculations for society’s cost of monopolies are less popular than none-
conomic values, such as “fairness,” and the Justice Department has cited the 
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increased cost to consumers as the primary harm caused by Apple in this 
case.221 
At trial, Apple also argued against prosecution, because there was a net ben-
efit to consumers as a result of its agency pricing deals with the publishers.222 
The defense claimed that Apple’s entry into e-book sales provided an alternate 
distribution channel for e-books, increasing competition between the retailers 
to offer authors and publishers better services and prices.223 As a result, Apple’s 
e-book market participation boded well for a future with a more robust e-book 
seller marketplace.224 Additionally, with Amazon’s market share reduced below 
its prior level of near monopoly, the retail giant was suddenly forced to com-
pete with Apple and others. The defense argued that Amazon would be com-
pelled to innovate and to offer better services to its customers and its growing 
(as well as its growing horde of self-published e-book authors). Although these 
ends did not ultimately justify Apple’s means under the law, perhaps they 
should have. 
V. THE CASE AGAINST AMAZON 
The Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division has successfully pursued a 
case against Apple and the five Publisher Defendants for colluding to raise the 
price of e-books, in restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.225 
But the government’s decision to prosecute the case has been criticized for 
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failing to recognize a major contextual factor that critics say negates the eco-
nomic justification for the case.226 Those critics point out that Amazon built and 
maintained a near total monopoly in the e-book market with negative results 
for consumers and the economy.227 According to this theory of justification, 
Amazon had leveraged market dominance to do irreversible damage to the 
publishing industry for several years before Apple even began selling e-
books.228 Amazon’s domination of e-book retail sales, the company’s impact on 
the print book industry, and the ways in which Amazon’s practices have “dam-
aged” the publishing industry are frequently raised by critics of the case 
against Apple as a means of defending Apple’s practices.229 Therefore, in order 
to evaluate the case against Apple, it is helpful to examine Amazon’s activities 
in the relevant market, looking for anticompetitive practices or any other con-
tributions to market failures that may undermine, at least on some level, the 
legitimacy of the case against Apple. 
Amazon’s involvement in the sale of e-books began in 2007 with an aggres-
sive entry into the market for digital books that combined the simultaneous 
introduction of the Kindle Reader mobile device and the company’s first offer-
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ing of e-books to read on the Kindle.230 Amazon’s prior position as the leading 
online seller of traditional printed books, combined with offering the innova-
tive and popular Kindle Reader, were important factors in fostering Amazon’s 
success in this new enterprise.231 E-books and mobile reading devices have 
been around for years, but Amazon’s sales far outpaced any prior entrant into 
the market.232 Critics of Amazon have pointed out that some additional note-
worthy practices helped propel Amazon to near total control of the market for 
e-books.233 By 2010, Amazon was responsible for an estimated 90% of all e-
books sold.234 This dominance was sustained in part by Amazon’s choice to 
offer bestselling e-book titles for the price of $9.99, even while it was usually 
paying the publishers several dollars more for each book it sold.235 This tactic, 
known as “loss leading,” is widely recognized as a means of attracting custom-
ers and expanding market share.236 Typically, a “loss leading” seller accepts a 
loss on a sold item or a class of items, at one time, with the expectation that the 
uniquely low price will drive buyers to purchase other items, which can be 
priced higher than competitive market value, in order to make up for the loss 
the seller takes on the “leader” item.237 
In Amazon’s case, the tactic may instead have been a “predatory pricing” 
scheme, intended to prolong Amazon’s leading position in the market while 
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relying on the prospect of a future opportunity to raise prices.238 The prices for 
most e-books Amazon sells cost no more than $9.99; further, Amazon claims 
that it sells its Kindle Reader device at cost.239 Critics contend that Amazon’s 
financial profile signals that a future price increase may be inevitable.240 Ana-
lysts have noted that Amazon’s current price-to-earnings ratio—that is, the 
share-price compared to the earnings-per-share—reveals that investors expect 
Amazon’s profits to increase drastically.241 However, it is unclear how Ama-
zon’s profits can increase without increasing the prices on the items it sells, 
including e-books.242 Critics also point out that e-books purchased for the Kin-
dle can only be read on a Kindle device or application and customers’ pur-
chased electronic libraries are therefore “locked” to their Kindles forever.243 
Therefore, the longer that Amazon could prolong its market dominance, then 
the more difficult it would be for its customer base to give up their Kindles and 
migrate to a competing e-reader platform, if Amazon raised prices for e-book 
bestsellers up to or above the wholesale price. 
The use of sub-market prices to keep competitors out of the market is not 
new.244 The drafters of the Sherman Act discussed hypothetical scenarios in 
which a monopolist discourages competitors by charging low prices that no 
one else can meet.245 But at that time and for many decades thereafter, much of 
activity that came to be referred to as “predatory pricing” involved charging 
prices that were too low for competitors to match, though still above the costs 
of the alleged violator.246 The modern use of the concept has been brought into 
focus, starting in the 1970s, by a highly influential paper that defined prices as 
predatory only when they are below the marginal costs of the seller.247 Then, in 
Matsushita v. Zenith, the Supreme Court downplayed the significance of 
predatory-pricing conspiracies. The Matsushita Court believed that such con-
spiracies were “self-deterring” due to the heavy costs that failure imposed on 
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the conspirators.248 Since Matsushita, predatory pricing has been considered 
rare and self-correcting, because the predator-seller must: first, sell products at 
a loss for long enough to drive competitors out of business permanently; and, 
second, have a reasonable expectation that he will be able to raise prices at a 
later time above the competitive market level and, thereby, profit.249 
Amazon argues that it did not engage in predatory pricing and that its in-
credible success in the e-book market is due to the fact that it was the first 
company that successfully entered that market.250 Amazon’s innovative tech-
nology and marketing strategies251 should be rewarded by profits, not prosecut-
ed. Amazon should argue that its monopoly control of the e-book market is 
temporary and would not harm any market competitors.252 E-books exist in a 
digital marketplace, a market that new entrants can enter easily.253 Distributing 
e-books involves practically no marginal costs;254 therefore, in the e-book mar-
ket, conspirators have less incentive, than they otherwise would in a traditional 
market,255 to use monopoly power to raise prices and sell fewer units. 
The price of a book should be what the market demands, but book pricing 
has been inflated by the publishers; and Amazon has used those inflated prices 
to seize the e-book market.256 It is important to distinguish between books that 
are interchangeable (genre fiction, diet books, manuals, and etc.) and books for 
which there are no substitutes, such as a book by your favorite author.257 Seth 
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Godin, founder of The Domino Project, argues that the natural price for e-
books is very low.258 For example, many self-publishing kindle authors will sell 
their books for a few dollars.259 Self-publishing authors claim that they have 
watched their sales multiply many times when they reduced their prices from 
$2.99 to $0.99.260 
Amazon might also defend its practices in e-books by pointing out that mo-
nopolies affect digital products differently than they do physical items.261 The 
printing and distribution of print books is costly.262 Every extra book printed 
and sent to stores presents a risk that those costs will not be recouped if the 
book remains unsold. Meanwhile, the marginal cost to distribute e-books is 
only a few cents,263 and entering the e-book market as a distributor requires 
little more than buying a domain name.264 Under these conditions, Amazon’s 
opportunity to use its dominant market position to engage in competitive pric-
ing was only viable if the company was working with a longer-term strategy to 
somehow keep new competitors from entering the e-book market after raising 
prices back to profitable levels. 
Ultimately, the case against Amazon for antitrust in e-book sales depends on 
an understanding of Amazon’s strategy.265 Amazon intended for e-books to 
replace print books as the standard medium, and it sought to make $9.99 the 
standard price for e-books. 266 Amazon’s internal strategy in e-books is some-
what inscrutable, and when Charlie Rose, in 2009, asked Amazon founder and 
CEO Jeff Bezos to describe his outstanding talent, he said it was his focus on 
the long term and a “willingness to be misunderstood.”267 Amazon was operat-
ing within the law, if the company was pricing e-books below its price paid to 
publishers in order to push customers to consider e-books generally. Then, 
once the market for digital books grew sufficiently, Amazon could begin to 
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charge higher prices.268 However, if Amazon sought to eliminate or inhibit 
competition by gaining the majority of U.S. e-book customers, and if Amazon 
then increased prices once it had locked-in its customer-base, then Amazon 
would be guilty of antitrust violations. 
VI. ANTITRUST POLICY SHOULD BE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO 
RECOGNIZE MARKET FAILURES AND AVOID MAKING 
MATTERS WORSE 
The contrasts between the legal liabilities of Amazon and Apple show an 
important need for an extensive policy analysis before the decision is made to 
prosecute an antitrust case. Anti-competitive behavior must be considered in 
light of the surrounding circumstances.269 Prosecutions, such as that against 
Apple, should be reined in. The Justice Department could adjust the policies 
that guide prosecutors to account for the discord between the prosecution of 
Apple and the inability to address Amazon’s prior “damage” to competition. A 
reasonably narrow rule could be added to the Antitrust Division Manual that, 
in the case of a significant justification of a possible market failure, which is 
not addressed by the Sherman Act as currently interpreted, prosecutors should 
decide against pressing antitrust charges.270 The negative consequence of pun-
ishing the success of lawful businesses is the highly publicized precedents that 
have wide effects on economic efficiency. 271 These consequences outweigh the 
harm from the missed prosecution of a bad actor.272 Prosecutors should incor-
porate the underlying logic of the second-best tradeoffs defense into their deci-
sions to prosecute Sherman Act violations.273 
Additionally, Congress should address this issue through statute. It would 
not be necessary, and may do more harm than good, to amend the Sherman 
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Act.274 Instead lawmakers may amend the Tunney Act, which regulates the Jus-
tice Department’s practices with regard to prosecuting and settling antitrust 
cases.275 The Tunney Act already requires that any entered consent decree must 
be “in the public interest” as determined by the court that enters the settle-
ment.276 An amendment could add the additional requirement that the court 
must find that the circumstances of the market, as it existed prior to the alleged 
antitrust, represented a healthier competitive process than the market circum-
stances that resulted from the alleged antitrust. This would sufficiently describe 
the vast majority of antitrust claims, leaving out only those prosecutions that 
punish behaviors that arguably led to an improvement in competition in the 
relevant market, such as that of Apple and the Publisher Defendants. 
Clearly this proposal is not a perfect solution. One problem is that, limited 
by the bounds of the Tunney Act, it would only regulate proposed consent de-
crees and would have no direct effect on the ability of prosecutors to pursue 
cases in court.277 However, if such a change was made, perhaps courts would 
take note of Congress’s intent to regulate antitrust prosecutions in this manner 
and allow the change to influence case law at the margins. The lion’s share of 
antitrust cases are settled by defendants—as were the cases against each of the 
Publisher Defendants—and this amendment would have created a possible 
barrier to those settlements, possibly forcing the Justice Department to follow 
through to a trial or else drop the charges.278 
If lawmakers go beyond the Tunney Act and seek to amend the Sherman 
Act substantially, they should be mindful of the precedents undergirding the 
law. Standing alone, § 1’s first sentence supports vast volumes of law and 
analysis, and it impacts practically every segment of the economy. So far, 
Congress has refrained from altering the substance of either of the Sherman 
Act’s sections.279 The Sherman Act’s framers’ contradictory and antiquated 
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statements suggest that few of them were certain of the specific legal and eco-
nomic implications of the law when it was passed.280 Thus, today’s lawmakers 
should be cautious when proposing to change the Sherman Act’s substance. 
Such changes could have numerous unintended consequences when interpreted 
by courts alongside the existing jurisprudence.281 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Justice Department’s successful case against Apple was based on clear 
precedents backed by a challenging case for Apple to maintain. As the law 
stands, there is little room for a defendant like Apple, in a case of a per se anti-
trust violation, to justify the existence of a harmful monopoly or other market 
failure. Therefore, Apple’s primary defense strategy was to contest the factual 
basis for the Justice Department’s case: that Apple knowingly participated in a 
conspiracy for the purpose of raising e-book prices.282 Nonetheless, Apple also 
pressed against the policy argument, which was being argued by the prosecu-
tion—as a result of Apple’s deals with the publishers, consumers were ulti-
mately harmed by higher prices on e-books.283 
For years, Amazon distressed the book publishing industry, authors, and 
brick-and-mortar stores with its insistence on charging $9.99 for most bestsel-
ling e-books, but that is not a crime. Nor is it a justification in any yet recog-
nized legal sense for Apple’s subsequent deals with the Publishers that ended 
the “$9.99 problem.” Although it is conceivable that Amazon’s internal strate-
gy was consistent with a plan to benefit indirectly from pricing e-books at a 
loss, there is insufficient evidence that Amazon intended to raise the prices on 
e-books at a later date. Doing so would immediately draw in competitors, who 
have little or no barriers to entry, and who would quickly eat up market share. 
Amazon’s strategy was most likely a means to expand adoption of the proprie-
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tary Kindle Store format for e-books, thus “locking” customers’ libraries of 
purchased in to the format for good. Even this theory is only supported by in-
ference, and is far too weak to support a Sherman Act § 2 case against Ama-
zon. 
But, as discussed above in the previous section, perhaps there should be an 
additional procedural check put in place in the Tunney Act to protect antitrust 
defendants who may argue that their actions are justified by significant market 
failures. Courts have produced voluminous law addressing just these questions 
and have reached some stable guidelines for reasonable limits for antitrust cas-
es, along with per se analysis for certain irredeemable practices. Changing the 
Sherman Act itself may do more harm than good, by affecting the existing ju-
risprudential standards in unintended ways. Instead, the problems of Apple’s 
prosecution can be addressed cautiously with narrow changes to ways that fed-
eral prosecutors conduct their cases. Either the Justice Department, or Con-
gress through an amendment to the Tunney Act, can add the requirement that 
prosecutors consider the possibility that it may not be in the public interest to 
prosecute supposedly anticompetitive practices like those of Apple when they 
result in some form of arguably positive effects on the relevant market. 
